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In this study, we report an unusual case of mutidimensional sensorimotor, cognitive, and
socio-affective preservation in an adult with extensive, acquired bilateral brain damage.
At age 43, patient CG sustained a cerebral hemorrhage and a few months later, she
suffered a second (ischemic) stroke. As a result, she exhibited extensive damage of the
right hemisphere (including frontal, temporal, parietal, and occipital regions), left Sylvian
and striatal areas, bilateral portions of the insula and the amygdala, and the splenium.
However, against all probability, she was unimpaired across a host of cognitive domains,
including executive functions, attention, memory, language, sensory perception (e.g.,
taste recognition and intensity discrimination), emotional processing (e.g., experiencing
of positive and negative emotions), and social cognition skills (prosody recognition,
theory of mind, facial emotion recognition, and emotional evaluation). Her functional
integrity was further confirmed through neurological examination and contextualized
observation of her performance in real-life tasks. In sum, CG’s case resists straightforward
classifications, as the extent and distribution of her lesions would typically produce
pervasive, multidimensional deficits. We discuss the rarity of this patient against the
backdrop of other reports of atypical cognitive preservation, expound the limitations of
several potential accounts, and highlight the challenges that the case poses for current
theories of brain organization and resilience.
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INTRODUCTION
The mind-brain association, as conceived in clinical neuroscience and neuropsychology, is an
abstract generalization. In working with multi-participant samples, behavioral findings stem from
data averages while anatomical results are obtained by transforming brain images into a standard
coordinate space. In both cases, strict outlier exclusion criteria are applied, so that atypical patterns
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are removed from ensuing models. These steps are critical
and perhaps unavoidable to characterize the organ’s functional
organization with some degree of external validity. Indeed,
thanks to this approach, replicable associations have been
established between damage to circumscribed regions and
impairments of specific functions, including motor (Zgaljardic
et al., 2003), somatosensory (Meyer et al., 2016), socio-cognitive
(Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Ibáñez et al., 2010, 2016b; Couto
et al., 2013; Baez et al., 2014, 2016b,c; Melloni et al., 2016),
interoceptive (Couto et al., 2015; García-Cordero et al., 2016),
executive (Rabinovici et al., 2015; Sedeño et al., 2016), linguistic
(Ullman, 2008; Cardona et al., 2014; García and Ibáñez, 2014,
2016; Bocanegra et al., 2015; García, 2015; Melloni et al., 2015;
García et al., 2016a,b,c; Abrevaya et al., 2017), and pragmatic
(Kaplan et al., 1990; Stemmer, 2008) skills.
However, such well established anatomo-clinical links (and
the theoretical views construed around them) are sometimes
challenged by unusual individual cases which do not easily
fit mainstream models in cognitive neuroscience. Such reports
include that of a man who efficiently served as a civil servant
although he had progressively lost roughly 75% of his brain
(Feuillet et al., 2007), that of a housewife with only mild motor
symptomatology despite primary cerebellar agenesis (Yu et al.,
2015), or multiple patients exhibiting considerable restitution
of language skills following early left hemispheromotomy (e.g.,
Hertz-Pannier et al., 2002). The same is true of studies showing
preserved pre- and post-operative temporal functions in patients
with large perisylvian arachnoid cysts (Kunz et al., 1988),
although such malformations typically impair various cognitive
domains (Wester, 2008). Cases such as these are valuable because,
in their exceptionality, they invite us to extend our current
conceptions of brain organization, plasticity, and functional
compensation, beyond the robust patterns that emerge in typical,
averaged, normalized data.
Building on these premises, we present the remarkable case
of patient CG, who exhibits widespread sparing of sensorimotor,
cognitive, and socio-affective functions despite extensive
brain damage acquired in adulthood. In particular, as shown
below, CG’s unusual pattern of preservation was convergently
corroborated through neuropsychological assessment, multiple
experimental tasks, neurological examination, and even
naturalistic observations of her daily functioning. The case could
thus prompt new reflections on the functional organization of
various neurocognitive systems.
CASE DESCRIPTION
Patient CG is a 44-year-old, right-handed Argentine woman who
suffered from adult-onset acquired neurovascular lesions. She
reports no individual or familial antecedents of psychiatric or
neurological disease, as well as no history of familial sinistrality.
She completed 18 years of formal education, is fluent in Spanish
and English, and prior to her lesion, she had a managerial
position at an international bank.
On September 9, 2011, at age 43, CG experienced intense
headaches and nausea, lost consciousness, and was swiftly
hospitalized. Computed tomography revealed a subarachnoid
hemorrhage (Fisher scale: grade IV; Hunt-Hess scale: grade V)
which caused increased intracranial pressure and compromised
sulci, cysterns, and fissures bilaterally. Cerebral angiography
confirmed a 5-mm dysplastic fusiform aneurysm at the right
Sylvian trifurcation, with a smaller incidental aneurysm at the
origin of the anterior temporal artery. Upon detection of severe
refractory intracranial hypertension, the patient underwent
right fronto-parieto-temporal decompressive surgery. Ten days
later, CG suffered a cardio-respiratory arrest and regained
consciousness after reanimation. She then exhibited severe
vasospasm for another ten days leading to extensive damage
(delayed cerebral ischaemia) of the right hemisphere which
includes frontal, insular, temporo-parietal, and occipital regions
as well as striatal areas in the left hemisphere. In addition, a
neurological examination revealed a transient, left visual neglect
syndrome that lasted 5 days (and which never relapsed in the
patient’s clinical history). Having spent 41 days in intensive
care, she was discharged with a moderate left paresis and the
following pharmacological treatment: omeprazole 20mg qd,
aspirin 100mg qd, enalapril 10mg bid, and paroxetine 20mg qd.
Six months later, the patient experienced convulsive status
epilepticus, which were treated first with phenytoin (100mg
e/8 h) and then with levetiracetam (1000mg bid). On December
5, 2012, she underwent craniotomy, with removal of the right
frontal, parietal, and temporal bones and implantation of a
prothesis and a titanium plaque (pharmacological treatment
after surgery included: bisoprolol 7.5mg qd, enalapril 10 mg bid,
quetiapine 12.5mg qd, and levetiracetam 2000mg qd). On
February 8, 2013, she suffered a second (ischemic) stroke
produced by a sudden reswallowing that might have been
related to the previous surgery. This resulted in damage
to the left anterior insular cortex and its underlying white
matter, the putamen, and the dorso-lateral amygdala. Yet, after
clinical stabilization, the patient presented neither additional
neurological deficits nor cognitive, emotional or behavioral
impairments. The only immediate changes she reported were
loss of sensitivity on the right hand and a transient form
of personality-color synesthesia (Ramachandran et al., 2012;
Safran and Sanda, 2015). She was soon discharged to her home,
under supervision of a caregiver, and started physical therapy
sessions. At this stage, her pharmacological treatment comprised
bisoprolol 7.5mg qd, quetiapine 12.5mg qd, levetiracetam
1000mg td and omeprazole 20mg qd. The patient then
agreed to undergo an extensive assessment, including formal
neuropsychological evaluations, neurological examinations, and




The patient and a group of controls completed several tasks
tapping domains typically associated with the patient’s lesioned
areas. The control samples were composed of healthy women
with no history of neurological or psychiatric disease. Note that
the wide range of tasks we used belonged to various previous
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(Couto et al., 2013, 2015) and on-going protocols, which did not
necessarily involve the same participants. Thus, for each domain
assessed, we selected the control group that best matched patient
CG in terms of age and education level (for details, see Table 1
through Table 4). All participants provided written informed
consent in agreement with the Declaration of Helsinki, and the
study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Institute
of Cognitive Neurology (INECO, now a host institution of the
Institute of Cognitive and Translational Neuroscience).
Neuroimaging: Lesion Localization
As in previous works (García-Cordero et al., 2015, 2016; Melloni
et al., 2016), the patient’s lesion was manually traced in native
space by an expert neurologist (BC) according to visible damage
on T1 and T2 scans. Then, this traced mask was normalized to
MNI space. Based on the overlap of this mask in an MNI brain
template, the neurologist confirmed the extensive compromise
of the right fronto-temporo-parietal cortices, left Sylvian and
striatal regions, and bilateral portions of the insula and the
amygdala (Figures 1A,B; see figure legend for anatomical details
of the lesion).
Instruments
The assessment protocol included multiple instruments tapping
overall cognitive status (including orientation, attention,
memory, verbal fluency, language, and visuospatial skills),
sensory perception, emotional processing, anxiety levels, and
social cognition.
Executive Functions
Executive functions were assessed through the INECO Frontal
Screening (IFS) battery (Torralva et al., 2009b), a sensitive
tool for neurodegenerative disease assessment (Torralva et al.,
2009a; Gleichgerrcht et al., 2011), in general, and medial frontal
executive functions (Roca et al., 2011), in particular. Over a
maximum total score of 30 points, a 25-point cut-off has shown
a sensitivity of 96.2% and a specificity of 91.5% in detecting
patients with dysexecutive syndrome (Torralva et al., 2009b).
This test includes eight tasks: (1) motor programming: subjects
TABLE 1 | Overall cognitive profile.
CG Controls (n = 6) p-value t-value zcc
Age 44 58.16 (6.73) 0.11 −1.94 −2.10
Education 18 15.83 (2.56) 0.47 0.78 0.84
IFS 25 24.83 (2.02) 0.94 0.07 0.08
ACE-R total 96 98.5 (1.97) 0.29 −1.17 −1.26
ACE-R subscales
Orientation 10 9.83 (0.41) 0.73 0.37 0.41
Attention 8 8 (0) – – –
Memory 23 24.33 (2.25) 0.61 −0.54 −0.59
Verbal fluency 13 13.67 (0.51) 0.28 −1.19 −1.29
Language 26 25.84 (0.41) 0.72 0.38 0.4
Visual skills 16 16 (0) – – –
Zcc, Z-scores; IFS, INECO Frontal Screening battery; ACE-R, Addenbrooke’s Cognitive
Examination Revised. Standard deviations are indicated between parentheses.
perform the Luria series (“fist, edge, palm”), first by copying the
administrator and then on their own; (2) conflicting instructions:
subjects are required to tap the table once when the administrator
taps it twice, or twice when the administrator taps it once; (3)
motor inhibitory control: subjects are told to tap the table only
once when the administrator taps it once, but to do nothing
when the examiner taps it twice; (4) numerical working memory:
subjects are asked to repeat a progressively longer string of
digits in the reverse order; (5) verbal working memory: subjects
are asked to list the months of the year backwards, starting
with December; (6) spatial working memory: the examiner
presents four cubes and points at them in a given sequence;
the subject is asked to repeat the sequence in reverse order;
(7) abstraction capacity: subjects are read proverbs and asked
to explain their meaning; (8) verbal inhibitory control: this
task, based on the Hayling test, measures the ability to inhibit
an expected response; in the first part, subjects are read three
sentences and asked to complete them correctly, as quickly as
possible; in the second part, they are asked to complete another
three sentences with a syntactically correct but semantically
incongruous word. The maximum global score on the IFS is 30
points.
Overall Cognitive State
The participants’ overall cognitive state was evaluated with a
version of the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination Revised,
adapted for the Argentine population (Torralva et al., 2011).
With a cut-off score of 85 points, this brief screening test has
a sensitivity of 97.5% and a specificity of 88.5%. It comprises
five subscales, tapping on attention/orientation (maximum score:
18), memory (maximum score: 26), fluency (maximum score:
14), language (maximum score: 26), and visuospatial skills
(maximum score: 16). The maximum global score of the test
is 100.
Taste
To evaluate taste intensity perception, we gave each participant
five sapid stimuli at four increasing concentrations: sucrose
TABLE 2 | Sensory perception.
CG Controls (n = 6) p-value t-value zcc
Age 44 58.67 (6.65) 0.1 −2.04 −2.2
Education 18 15.83 (2.56) 0.47 0.78 0.84
Global taste intensity 61.25 38.58 (13.74) 0.2 1.5 1.64
Sweet recognition 2 1.2 (0.44) 0.17 1.63 1.78
Salty recognition 1 0.6 (0.89) 0.7 0.4 0.44
Acid recognition 2 2 (0) – – –
Bitter recognition 1 1 (0.7) 1 0 0
Global taste recognition 75 65 (22.36) 0.7 0.4 0.44
Smell threshold 75 45.83 (6.97) 0.01 3.87 4.18
Smell recognition 41.67 87.5 (4.56) >0.001 −9.28 −10.03
Zcc, Z-scores. Taste was assessed with the Q-tip test. Smell was assessed with the Sniffin’
Sticks test. Standard deviations are indicated between parentheses. Data missing for one
subject on the Taste test.
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TABLE 3 | Anxiety levels and emotional induction.
CG Controls (n = 6) p-value t-value zcc
Age 44 50 (10.63) 0.62 −0.52 −0.56
Education 18 18.67 (1.21) 0.63 −0.5 −0.55
ANXIETY
STAI-S 39 36 (11.42) 0.82 0.24 0.26
ALL EMOTIONS
Experience intensity 43.25 40.91 (6.82) 0.46 0.31 0.34
Pleasantness intensity 3.5 2.91 (0.73) 0.49 0.73 0.79
Arousal intensity 4.75 4.22 (1.25) 0.72 0.38 0.41
Emotional experience 104.5 107.25 (2.38) 0.33 −1.07 −1.15
POSITIVE EMOTIONS
Experience intensity 50.5 53 (4.13) 0.59 −0.56 −0.6
Pleasantness intensity 4 5.67 (2.16) 0.5 −0.71 −0.77
Arousal intensity 4.5 4.58 (2.08) 0.97 −0.03 −0.03
Emotional experience 109 124.41 (14.14) 0.35 −1 −1.09
NEGATIVE EMOTIONS
Experience intensity 34.75 29.7 (11.5) 0.7 0.4 0.43
Pleasantness intensity 1.5 1.12 (0.94) 0.72 0.37 0.39
Arousal intensity 4.75 5.54 (2) 0.72 −0.36 −0.39
Emotional experience 93.5 96.31 (6.55) 0.7 −0.4 −0.42
NEUTRAL EMOTIONS
Experience intensity 53 51.25 (7.27) 0.83 0.22 0.24
Pleasantness intensity 7 3.75 (1.17) 0.05 2.56 2.77
Arousal intensity 5 1.25 (1.29) 0.04 2.68 2.89
Emotional experience 122 111.25 (9.73) 0.35 1.02 1.1
Zcc, Z-scores. STAI-S, state version of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory. Emotional
induction was assessed with the video-based paradigm reported in Feinstein (2012).
Standard deviations are indicated between parentheses.
TABLE 4 | Social cognition.
CG Controls (n = 8) p-value t-value zcc
Age 44 51.12 (7.16) 0.37 −0.93 −0.99
Education 18 13.87 (3.97) 0.36 0.97 1.03
Prosody recognition 0.6 0.64 (0.15) 0.8 −0.26 −0.28
Theory of mind (RTME) 14 23.5 (5.95) 0.19 −1.47 −1.59
Facial emotion recognition
(E-morphing)
0.58 0.79 (0.12) 0.17 −1.53 −1.62
Emotional evaluation (TASIT) 13 16.14 (1.57) 0.11 −1.86 −1.99
Zcc, Z-scores. Prosody recognition was assessed following the protocol reported in Couto
et al. (2013) and Scott et al. (1997). Theory of mind was assessed through the Reading-
the-Mind-in-the-Eyes (RTME) test. Facial emotion recognition was assessed via an e-
morphing task. Emotional evaluation was assessed with the Test for the Awareness of
Social Inference (TASIT). Data missing for two subjects on the prosody recognition and
RTME tests, and for one subject on the TASIT. Standard deviations are indicated between
parentheses.
(0.03, 0.1, 0.3, 1.0M), sodium chloride (NaCl; 0.03, 0.1, 0.3,
1.0M), citric acid (0.001, 0.003, 0.01, 0.032M), and quinine
hydrochloride (QHC1; 0.00003, 0.0001, 0.0003, 0.001 M). Each
stimulus was dissolved in distilled water and presented at room
temperature as part of an ascending concentration series, as
in the Q-Tip test (Bartoshuk et al., 1985). With the subject’s
tongue extended and stabilized between the lips, each stimulus
was applied to both sides of the anterior tongue using a
sterile, cotton-tipped applicator. Participants used a number
line (range= 0–10) to report the intensity of the stimulus
before retracting their tongue. Subjects were told that the
first stimulus of each concentration series, distilled water,
rated zero on the taste intensity scale. The output score
was intensity feeling (from 1 to 50), which, for the global
taste intensity score, was later transformed into percentage
values.
Then, to measure the subjects’ ability to identify five
basic tastants, we used the maximum concentrated stimuli
from the previous task (0.3M sucrose, 0.3M NaCl, 0.01M
citric acid, and 0.0003M QHC1 or distilled water) and
applied them on their tongues following the same procedure
described above. Each side of the tongue was tested two
times for the five tastants. Participants indicated the perceived
flavor by pointing to a labeled card in a five-option forced
choice: salty, sweet, sour, bitter, or non-flavor. This test
was conducted twice for each stimulus following procedures
described elsewhere (Pritchard et al., 1999). The output
score was correct responses from 1 to 10, which, for the
global taste recognition score, was transformed into percentage
values.
Smell
To establish odor sensitivity thresholds, we used eight solutions
at increasing concentrations of phenyl ethyl alcohol in a staircase
procedure based on the Sniffin’ Sticks test (Hummel et al., 1997).
Odor identification skills were assessed through the commercial
test of olfactory function Brief Smell Identification Test (Doty
et al., 1984), consisting of 12 stimuli with a forced-choice answer.
Finally, threshold and identification means were used to create a
global score variable representing overall smell performance.
Then, individual odor sensitivity was assessed by acquiring
thresholds for phenyl ethyl alcohol with an ascending double-
forced choice staircase procedure. We used an eight-step
geometric series, starting from a 4% phenyl ethyl alcohol
solution (dilution ratio 1:2 in deionized water). Each subject
was presented for 3 s at a distance of 3mm from each nostril
with two bottles in a randomized order: one contained only
the deionized water, and the other contained the odorant at a
certain dilution. While blindfolded, the subjects were asked to
identify the odor-containing bottle. The threshold was defined
as the trial in which the participant correctly identified five
consecutive stimuli (Hummel et al., 1997) and this number
was later transformed to percentage of intensity of perceived
smell.
Finally, odor identification abilities were further evaluated
through the B-SIT (Sensonics Inc.). This test consisted
of 12 stimuli, each presented for 3 s at 3mm from each
nostril. Each participant selected which odor was perceived
from a forced-choice list with four options. The smell
identification score was measured as the number of
correct choices, ranging from 0 to 12, with higher scores
indicating better identification. The 12 odors commonly
used in commercially available tests were smoke, chocolate,
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Lesion extent in MNI space. Multislice overlap of lesions within a normalized brain from the MNI brain atlas. On the right hemisphere, these included
the fronto-insulo-temporal cortices, spanning from the medial anterior temporal lobe (parahippocampal gyrus and amygdala) to the mid and superior temporal gyri; the
supramarginal and angular gyri; the inferior parietal lobule; almost the complete insula; and a portion of the putamen and the inferior frontal operculum. On the left
hemisphere, compromised regions included the left anterior insula and its underlying white matter, the putamen, and the dorso-lateral amygdala. (B) Brain damage.
Original T1 sequence showing lateral and axial views of the patient’s brain. (C) Sensory perception. Scores on tasks tapping smell and taste. (D) Emotional
processing. Scores on a video-based emotional induction task inducing positive, negative, and neutral emotions. (E) Social cognition. Scores on tasks tapping
emotional prosody recognition, theory of mind, facial emotion recognition, and emotional evaluation. Blue bars and lines represent controls’ mean scores and standard
deviations, respectively. Red bars represent the patient’s scores. All scores are presented in percentage values. Asterisks (*) indicate statistical differences at p < 0.05.
onion, strawberry, gasoline, turpentine, banana, pineapple,
cinnamon, soap, lemon, and rose. The number of correct
responses was later transformed into an identification
percentage.
Anxiety Levels
Anxiety levels were assessed with the state subscale of the
State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1970), an
introspective, self-report instrument widely used in research
with adult populations. All 20 items of the subscale were
included.
Emotional Induction
Each participant watched nine affectively-laden clips (Feinstein,
2012) aimed to induce specific emotions classified as positive,
negative, and neutral. Each clip was chosen according
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to previously published criteria, including brevity, self-
containment, intensity, and specificity (Feinstein, 2012). Clips
were presented in a pseudo-randomized order. Immediately
after each clip, participants answered questions about peak
intensity (“Experience intensity”), pleasantness (“Pleasantness
intensity”), and arousal (“Arousal intensity”) of the experienced
emotion. Finally, they completed the Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule (Watson et al., 1988).
Emotional Prosody Recognition
Prosody recognition was assessed following previously reported
protocols (Scott et al., 1997; Couto et al., 2013). Stimuli
comprised six disyllabic concrete nouns with neutral meaning
and spoken with six different intonations that intended to convey
emotions of happiness, anger, fear, disgust, sadness, and surprise.
Participants were presented with the stimuli binaurally and after
each presentation, they were asked to identify the emotion by
choosing one out of six options.
Theory of Mind
Theory of mind was assessed through the Reading-the-Mind-in-
the-Eyes (RTME) test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Participants
were presented with 36 gray-scale pictures showing cropped
portraits focused on the faces’ eyes. Four words denoting mental
states are presented round each picture and participants must
choose the word that best describes what the person is thinking or
feeling. Only one response is correct for each trial. The maximum
score is 36.
Facial Emotion Recognition
Facial emotion recognition was assessed via an e-morphing task
(Hurtado et al., 2009; Couto et al., 2013). This computerized test
features six basic emotions (happiness, surprise, sadness, fear,
anger, and disgust) obtained from the Pictures of Affect Series
(Ekman and Friesen, 1976). Each stimulus was morphed for each
prototype emotion and for a neutral state (Young et al., 1997),
and presented in 20 frames of 500 ms each. Participants indicated
when they recognized each emotion by pressing a button.
Emotional Evaluation
Emotional evaluation was assessed with the Test for the
Awareness of Social Inference (TASIT) (McDonald et al., 2006),
a sensitive social perception test to assesses the recognition
of spontaneous emotional expressions (fearful, surprised, sad,
angry, and disgusted) in short videos. This task introduces
contextual cues of the social situation (e.g., speaker demeanor,
including prosody, facial movement, and gestures) and additional
processing demands (e.g., adequate speed of information
processing, selective attention, and social reasoning) that are not
taxed when viewing static displays. All scripts are neutral in
content and do not lend themselves to a particular emotion. After
viewing each scene, the test participant was instructed to choose
the emotion expressed by the actor from a forced-choice list.
Statistical Analysis
Demographic and behavioral data of the patient and the
controls were compared with Crawford’s modified two-tailed
t-test (Crawford and Howell, 1998; Crawford and Garthwaite,
2002, 2012; Crawford et al., 2009, 2011). This test is robust for
non-normal distributions, presents low rates of type-I error, and
has proved successful in previous single-case studies (Straube
et al., 2010; Couto et al., 2013, 2014), even when the control
sample comprises fewer than five subjects (Crawford, 1998).
Alpha levels were set at p < 0.05.
RESULTS
CG’s performance was similar to that of controls on almost
every domain assessed. She showed no deficits in executive
functions (t = 0.07, p = 0.94), overall cognitive state (t = −1.17,
p = 0.29) or individual high-order subdomains (all ps > 0.2)—
for details, see Table 1. Also, her taste recognition (t = 0.4
p = 0.7) and intensity discrimination (t = 1.5, p = 0.2) skills
were spared despite a reduced sense of smell (t = −9.28,
p < 0.001)—for details, see Figure 1C and Table 2). Moreover,
she was unimpaired in overall emotional experience processing
(t = −1.07, p = 0.33), with preserved abilities to ascertain
various aspects of both positive and negative emotions (all
ps > 0.33)—for details, see Figure 1D and Table 3. Finally, she
evinced normal anxiety levels (t = 0.24, p = 0.82) and showed
no disruptions of her social cognition skills, including prosody
recognition (t = −0.26, p = 0.8), theory of mind (t = −1.47,
p = 0.19), facial emotion recognition (t = −1.53, p = 0.17),
and emotional evaluation (t = −1.86, p = 0.11)—for details, see
Figure 1E and Table 4.
DISCUSSION
One would expect CG’s extensive pattern of neural damage
to have severely compromised her functionality. Indeed,
cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence shows that lesion
site information predicts the severity of specific cognitive
deficits after stroke (Hope et al., 2013). In this sense,
the patient exhibited various patterns of damage known to
systematically disrupt various domains. For example, putative
associations have been established between frontostriatal lesions
and motor disability (Zgaljardic et al., 2003), insulo-parietal
compromise and somatosensory deficiencies (Meyer et al.,
2016), bilateral fronto-insular damage and social cognition
deficits (Ibáñez et al., 2010, 2016a; Couto et al., 2013; Baez
et al., 2014, 2016b; Melloni et al., 2016), bilateral frontal
atrophy and executive dysfunctions (Rabinovici et al., 2015), left
perisylvian lesions and language impairment (Ullman, 2008),
and right-sided frontal disturbances and altered pragmatic
skills (Kaplan et al., 1990; Stemmer, 2008). Moreover, the
regions affected should typically disrupt multiple functional
networks, such as the salience network (Seeley et al., 2007),
the social context network (Ibáñez and Manes, 2012; Baez
et al., 2016a), and the fronto-parietal attention network (Ptak,
2012).
These mappings, though subject to some inter-individual
variability at a relatively fine scale, are remarkably consistent and
systematic across subjects. However, formal assessments revealed
almost none of the expected deficits. CG’s performance was
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similar to that of matched controls on tasks tapping executive
functions and overall cognitive state (e.g., attention, memory,
language). Also, her taste was preserved despite a reduced sense
of smell, and she was unimpaired in emotional processing and
social cognition skills.
Additional data gleaned during neurological examinations
further confirm CG’s preserved abilities. She has intact motor
skills: she routinely types on her computer, walks at least 1 h each
morning, and goes swimming every week. Likewise, except for
hyposensitivity on her right hand and a reduced sense of smell,
her sensory abilities (e.g., auditory perception, taste, temperature
processing, skin sensitivity, proprioception) are completely
spared. For example, she could perfectly identify sounds within
and outside the meeting room, and on one occasion she
reasonably complained that the coffee was too hot and sweet; also
no other tactile or somatosensory alterations were mentioned in
her clinical history or in the several interviews conducted in the
course of the study. Moreover, her emotional repertoire seems
uncompromised: during the interviews she exhibited normal
basic and social emotions, and she provided clear examples
of recent scenarios in which she predictably experienced joy,
fear, frustration, exultation, and other feelings. She is also
capable of inferring other people’s beliefs and emotional states,
as seen, for instance, in her detection of anxiousness when
two of the present authors were readying themselves for a
book presentation. Additionally, her interpersonal behavior is
consistently adequate during interactions with the institution’s
staff, her caregivers, and her children, except for a tendency to be
overly open regarding her personal problems (she is unreserved
in discussing her lesions, her feelings, and the social difficulties
she has encountered, even with people she meets for the first
time). However, no signs of hypomania were observed in her
clinical history or in the several interviews she granted us in the
course of the study.
Linguistically and pragmatically, she gives no signs of
impairment: her articulatory, phonological, lexical, and
grammatical abilities are fully preserved, as are her prosodic
and turn-taking capacities (let alone her knack for bantering,
construing metaphors, and introducing ironic remarks).
Even more striking are her mnemonic skills: her procedural
and semantic knowledge is fully preserved, as shown in her
smooth execution of various action routines (e.g., handling her
cell phone, tying her shoe laces) and her intact naming and
classification skills (e.g., she could flawlessly denominate all the
objects she had thematically organized in different sections of
her purse); furthermore, her declarative memory is extremely
detailed for events which happened weeks, months, and even
years ago. She could describe scenes from her childhood and
adolescence, she meticulously narrated episodes occurring
immediately before and after her strokes, she remembered the
names, specialties, and suggestions of all her doctors, and she
could recount details of dozens of books she had read throughout
her life. Finally, her executive functions (including attention,
working memory, and prospective thought) are notably acute.
During our lengthy interviews she remained focused, efficiently
resumed topics interrupted by the flow of dialog, and sensibly
discussed her plans and concerns for the future. Nevertheless,
a mild inhibitory deficit may underlie the above-mentioned
tendency to discuss private parts of her life without reservations,
even with people she has never met before.
Still, the most compelling demonstrations of her functional
integrity emerged outside formal assessment settings. In the quest
of third-party impressions, two of the present authors (AMG
and AI) visited the patient’s home to interview her mother and
a long-time friend. Both caregivers confirmed our observations
and were unable to identify any significant impairment. Themost
eloquent proof, however, was CG’s resourcefulness as a host. Her
preparation of various beverages and snacks, handling of trays
and cups, and coordination of the conversation attested to her
capacity to efficiently fulfill multiple concurrent tasks even under
the shifting demands of a complex, context-rich setting.
Therefore, this case resists straightforward classifications.
While CG presents some deficits (e.g., right-hand hyposensitivity,
smell deficiencies), the extent and distribution of her lesions and
the nature of their etiologies would lead one to expect muchmore
widespread deficits. Seen under this light, the case constitutes
an anomaly, since it defies most expectations and theories about
neurocognition.
CG adds to an interesting corpus of case studies challenging
mainstream accounts of the relationship between brain anatomy
and function. For example, Feuillet et al. (2007) reported on
a civil servant with hydrocephalus, who had an IQ of 75,
fully preserved everyday functionality, and normal medical and
neurological development despite progressive loss of nearly
three fourths of his brain. His maintenance of low- and high-
level cognitive functions, including consciousness, has puzzled
scientists for almost a decade. Also relevant are the cases of
a 58-year-old patient with subtotal cerebellar agenesis and a
completely normal neurological profile (Sener and Jinkins, 1993)
and that of a 24-year-old woman who was born without a
cerebellum and had only mild symptoms in functions associated
with such a structure (Yu et al., 2015): despite slight delays in her
development of oral and locomotive skills and moderate signs
of dysarthria and dysmetria, this patient had intact orientation
and motor independence, while giving no signs of sensory
or linguistic dysfunction. Both individuals deviate from the
widespread pattern of impairments typically observed in patients
with primary cerebellar agenesis—for a review, see Yu et al.
(2015).
Like the studies cited above, CG’s case does not find
a straightforward explanation in mainstream views of
neurocognition. First, her lesion was acquired late in life, which
precludes the operation of early compensatory mechanisms
present in cases of agenesis or tissue removal in infancy or
childhood. Alternatively, CG might have recruited completely
atypical circuits since birth to process each of her preserved
functions, so that her lesions were not actually compromising
putative hubs. Yet, this is also unlikely, given that her pattern
of damage extended across multiple cortical and subcortical
areas bilaterally, which leaves little chances for possible
uncompromised mechanisms subserving such functionally
varied domains.
Admittedly, we cannot fully rule out overall compensatory
brain changes, since much of the evidence we reported was
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obtained roughly 1 year after CG’s second stroke. However,
favorable post-stroke rewiring could hardly account for the case
in its entirety. Indeed, plastic mechanisms in several regions
(particularly, the prefrontal and hippocampal cortices) prove
vulnerable to aging, due to changes in neuronal morphology
and connectivity, among other factors (Burke and Barnes, 2006).
It would thus seem unlikely for multiple functions to have
become near-optimally subserved by compensatory or alternative
mechanisms only a few months after adult-onset strokes.
Second, we have entertained the hypothesis that this may be
an extreme case of cognitive reserve, the brain’s capacity for
functional resilience following damage or throughout healthy
aging (Stern, 2012). Indeed, this conjecture was nurtured by the
fact that CG features many possible neuroprotective factors. She
has never smoked or drunk alcohol and always kept a balanced
diet. She has high educational achievements and is fluent in two
languages. Since childhood, she constantly engaged in logical
games and mindfulness-like exercises, practiced several sports,
developed artistic skills, engaged in extracurricular scientific
studies, and joined different cliques in each of these areas.
Nevertheless, the case would prove anomalous even if seen
under this light. Indeed, none of her potentially neuroprotective
experiences was unusually intense (she was an average student,
her artistic prowess is within the norm of an amateur, and her
use of a second language was confined to very specific scenarios
and only during a few years of her life). Likewise, neither does
the absence of risk factors seem enough to explain the full
preservation of her cognitive, emotional, and behavioral skills (as
opposed to just one specific subdomain) upon acquiring severe
lesions in putative neural substrates. However, the combination
of these features might have contributed to her resilience via a
cumulative effect—though this remains speculative.
Third, it may be that the cardiac arrest and/or the second
stroke suffered by CG paradoxically contributed to resolving
deficits triggered by her first episode. This conjecture follows
from both animal and human research. For example, serial
lesions of the prefrontal association cortex in rhesus monkeys can
induce milder behavioral impairments than one-stage lesions of
the same or less severity (Rosen et al., 1971). Similarly, highly
specific cognitive abnormalities (e.g., foreign accent syndrome)
triggered by a left frontoparietal infarct have been observed to
disappear following a second stroke compromising contralateral
regions (Cohen et al., 2009). Unfortunately, this possibility
cannot be directly assessed since there is no behavioral data on
CG’s cognitive skills after her first stroke. However, even if this
were a feasible explanation of the present case, it would still
prove hard to accommodate withinmost frameworks in cognitive
neuroscience.
Finally, it could be that many or all of the above factors
were implicated in CG’s atypical anatomo-clinical profile.
Should that be so, our main contention would remain, as
no extant theory offers an explicit integrated account of late-
onset multidimensional plasticity, experience-based cognitive
reserve, and paradoxical recovery triggered by a second lesion.
If anything, this patient exposes the limitations of our current
understanding of brain organization and resilience.
CONCLUSION
In sum, CG highlights the importance of considering individual
cases to challenge our assumptions about neurocognition.
Although our work is limited because of the absence of functional
imaging data, her widespread preservation of cognitive functions
despite extensive acquired damage merits scholarly attention.
Beyond our current theories of brain plasticity, compensatory
mechanisms, or cognitive reserve, there seem to be hitherto
unknown forms of functional resilience. Reporting on unusual
patients and disseminating the puzzling findings they offer
contributes to fostering new avenues of research and thus inspire
both theoretical and translational developments in the field.
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